Sexual violence and the common purpose at the international court and ad hoc tribunals by Guilford, Katherine Briar
 1 
 
 
 
KATHARINE BRIAR GUILFORD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND THE COMMON 
PURPOSE AT THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
AND AD HOC TRIBUNALS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in partial completion of the LLB (Honours) Degree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Faculty of Law 
 
Victoria University of Wellington 
 
2016 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Abstract 
 
The impunity of high-level military and political leaders sits at the heart of the challenge 
for feminist legal advocates to champion sexual violence's equal recognition of a crime 
at international law. Repetitively, sexual violence crimes are a particular risk of the 
failure of the criminal law to surpass a number of pervasive assumptions about the 
nature of these crimes. In 2014, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) issued three 
judgments that analysed the relationship between sexual violence and common purpose 
liability in ground criminal conduct. This paper provides a critique of these judgments 
by drawing out the inconsistent and limited interpretation of the law and engendering 
legal concepts for a crime that is inherently gendered.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approximately 14,874 words, excluding abstract, contents, footnotes and 
bibliography.  
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I Introduction 
 
On 7 March 2014, General Katanga, leader of the Forces de Résistance Patriotique 
d’Ituri (FRPI), was convicted for charges of murder as a crime against humanity; and 
murder, attacking a civilian population, destruction of property and pillaging as war 
crimes for his involvement in a common criminal plan to wipe out the village of Bogoro 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo.1 Under the International Criminal Court's (ICC) 
Rome Statute, where a group of persons acts with a common criminal purpose, for 
example a militia group executing a massacre Bogoro village, an individual may only 
be found criminally responsibility for those crimes that fall within the common purpose 
of that criminal group.2 Therefore, Katanga was acquitted of charges relating to sexual 
violence, as the Court considered these crimes alone fell outside that common criminal 
plan.3  
 
On 23 January 2014, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) Appeals Chamber reversed acquittals pertaining to sexual violence crimes for 
three accused: Pavković, Commander of the 3rd Army of the Vojska Jugoslavije (VJ), 
Šainović, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and 
Lukić, head of the Ministry of Interior Police staff of Kosovo (MUP) for their role in 
the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo in 1999.4 Furthermore, four days later on 27 January 
2014, the ICTY Appeals Chamber also reversed the acquittal of Ðordević, the Assistant 
Minister to the Serbian Minister of the Internal Affairs and Chief of the Public Security 
Department, for sexual violence charges arising from his role in that ethnic cleansing.5 
In both of these cases, the Court found that instances of persecution through sexual 
violence, while considered to fall outside the common criminal purpose to ethnically 
cleanse Kosovo, were a natural and foreseeable consequence of its execution. 6  
Following the theory of extended joint criminal enterprise applied at the ICTY, a 
member of a group acting with a common criminal purpose, may be found guilty from                                                         
1 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment) ICC Trial Chamber II ICC-04/04-01/07, 7 March 2014. 
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 2187 UNTS 3 (opened for signature July 1998, 
entered into force 1 July 2002), art 25(3). 
3 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment) at [1664]. 
4 Prosecutor v Šainović (Appeal Judgment) ICTY Appeals Chamber IT-05-87-A Appeals Chamber, 23 
January 2014. 
5 Prosecutor v Ðordević (Appeal Judgment) ICTY Appeals Chamber IT-05-87/1-A, 27 January 2014. 
6 Prosecutor v Ðordević (Appeal Judgment) at [921]; Prosecutor v Šainović (Appeal Judgment) at 
[1581], [1591]. 
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crimes that, while not part of the common purpose, were a natural and foreseeable 
consequence of its execution.7 
 
Undeniably, conviction for sexual violence crimes is a positive step towards justice for 
victims of sexual violence and the reconstruction of post-conflict societies. However, 
this paper intends to look past the binary of conviction versus acquittal to draw out the 
limited and inconsistent interpretation of the law and engendering of legal concepts of 
sexual violence crimes, which is prevalent in all three judgments. In particular, the 
paper will analyse the three judgments for indicia of an inconsistent factual treatment 
of sexual violence as compared to other violent crimes; failure to utilise legal concepts 
to reflect the nature of sexual violence crimes; incomplete assessment of the scale and 
harm of sexual violence crimes; and failure to place sexual violence crimes within the 
wide context of armed conflict.   
 
The paper will proceed in several parts. The first part will provide a brief outline of the 
multifaceted purposes of international criminal trials and the challenges that are posed 
to the trial and conviction of sexual violence crimes by pervasive historical assumptions 
about the nature of these crimes. The second part will provide the reader with the legal 
foundation of the mode of individual criminal responsibility applied at the ICC in the 
Katanga case, namely art 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute. The third part will then analyse 
the Katanga judgment, highlighting the failure of the ICC Trial Chamber to take a 
consistent and gendered approach to the trial of sexual violence crimes. The fourth 
section will move on to outline the law of joint criminal enterprise as applied at the 
ICTY, in order to provide the reader with a basic understanding of this mode of 
individual criminal responsibility and in preparation to compare the jurisprudence of 
the ICC with the ICTY. The fifth section will analyse the approach of the ICTY Trial 
and Appeal Chambers toward sexual violence in Šainović and Đorđević to illustrate 
that, despite the different mode of liability employed at the ICTY, the same inconsistent 
approach to sexual violence can be found in these judgments. The paper will conclude 
with some final comments and possible means to address the pervasive inconsistency 
with which sexual violence is treated as regards other violent crimes.  
                                                        
7 Prosecutor v Tadić (Appeal Judgment) ICTY Appeals Chamber IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999. 
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II The Trial of Sexual Violence 
 
This part of the paper will discuss the role that international criminal law performs in 
post-conflict reconstruction. It will then consider the evolution of sexual violence 
crimes at international law and highlight some of the challenges in achieving criminal 
justice for these crimes at the supranational level.   
 
A The Role of International Criminal Law 
 
Individual criminal prosecution for crimes at the international level serves multiple 
functions. Retributive justice emphasises the just deserts of the perpetrator, as the 
accused's deserving of punishment for the commission of atrocities.8 Prosecution may 
also document crimes for the historical record, provide closure to victims, their 
families, or on the past more generally, and promote national reconciliation.9 Trials 
may inspire transition societies to adopt and affirm the rule of law, the inherent dignity 
of individuals, and human and legal rights that are denied at the domestic level.10 
Prosecution of sexual violence during armed conflict is crucial to restoring the dignity 
and integrity of individuals who have experienced a deeply injurious mental and 
physical crime that requires acknowledgement and punishment of the perpetrator. Such 
punishment may also support the removal of stigma surrounding sexual violence and 
affirm women's value and equal social standing.11  Moreover, international trials may 
provide an exemplar from which domestic courtrooms of observing and participating 
states may learn, thereby remaking practice at the local level.12 
 
Furthermore, criminal punishment is an effective insurance against future criminal 
activity. 13  The function of international criminal law as a deterrent is reflected 
prominently in the Preamble to the Rome Statute, which highlights the “prevention…of 
                                                        
8 Margaret M deGuzman "Giving Priority to Sex Crime Prosecutions: The Philosophical Foundations of 
a Feminist Agenda" (2011) Int C L R 11 515 at 521.  
9 Antonio Cassese “Reflections on International Criminal Justice” (2003) MLR 61(1) 1.  
10 Diane F Orentlicher “Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior 
Regime” (1991) 100(8) Yale LJ 2537 at 2542.  
11 Finnuala Ni Aolain, Dina Francesca Haynes and Naomi Chan "Criminal Justice for Gendered Violence 
and Beyond" (2011) Int C L R 11 425 at 442. 
12 At 440.  
13 Leslie Vinjamuri “Deterrence, Democracy, and the Pursuit of International Justice” (2010) Ethics Int 
Aff 24(2) 191.  
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the most serious crimes of concern to the international community” as a central purpose 
of the Court.14 This rationale has also been reflected in statements of the ICC's current 
Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda and her predecessor, Luis Moreno Ocampo. 15   For 
example, in a speech shortly after his election as the ICC’s first Prosecutor in April 
2003, Moreno Ocampo stated:16  
I deeply hope that the horrors humanity has suffered during the twentieth century will 
serve us as a painful lesson, and that the creation of the International Criminal Court 
will help us to prevent those atrocities from being repeated in the future. 
 
The opposite side of the coin for law as a deterrent is that, if law is unavailable to punish 
crimes committed on a massive scale, no lesson can be offered for the future. Failure 
to bring charges and achieve convictions vitiates the authority of law itself, sapping its 
power to deter proscribed conduct. Respect for international humanitarian law will 
suffer where criminal conduct can be practiced with impunity, in the words of Herbert 
Fingarette, unless society imposes sanction when its laws are violated, the law 
"becomes functionally a mere appeal, "the concept of law as a requirement becomes 
unintelligible."17 Societies recently scourged by widespread criminal violence provide 
sobering cause to believe that tyranny begins where law ends. 18  Consequently, 
prosecution of sexual violence crimes is a key component to ending global violence 
against women: forms of sexual violence must be punished and seen to be punished, if 
sexual violence is to be prevented.19 
 
                                                        
14 Rome Statute, preambular par 5.  
15 See Fatou Bensouda “Reflections from the International Criminal Court Prosecutor” (2012) Case W 
Res J Intl L 45(1) 509. 
16 Luis Moreno Ocampo "Election of the Prosecutor, Statement by Mr Moreno Ocampo" (press release, 
ICC-OTP-20030502-10, 22 April 2003).  
17 Herbert Fingarette "Review: Rethinking Criminal Law Excuses" (1980) Yale LJ 89(5) 1002 at 1014. 
18 Orentlicher, above n 8, at 2542. Michael Broache "The Effects of Prosecutions on Sexual Violence in 
Armed Conflict during the 'ICC Era' 2002–2009" (paper presented at the Workshop on Sexual Violence 
and Armed Conflict: New Research Frontiers, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, 2–3 
September 2014). 
19Linda Bianchi "The Prosecution of Rape and Sexual Violence: Lessons from Prosecutions at the ICTR" 
in Anne-Marie de Brouwer, Charlotte Ku, Renée Römkens and Larissa van den Herik "(eds) Sexual 
Violence as an International Crime: Interdisciplinary Approaches (intersentia, Cambridge, 2013) 123 at 
124.  
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B Sexual Violence at International Criminal Law and Ongoing Challenges 
 
Sexual violence crimes have been the subject of centuries of inaction at international 
law.20 However, human experience has come to reveal the link between armed conflict, 
violent crime and the rape of women and girls as irrefutable and well established.21 
Rape may be used during armed conflict to dishonour and demoralise the enemy, to 
destabilise, disempower and terrorize whole communities, or the effect genocide 
through deliberate impregnation or termination of existing pregnancies to disrupt the 
victims' on-going existence as a defined ethnic group.22  Sexual violence during armed 
conflict has been wrested from the sphere of private wrongs, where it was once 
considered linked to sexual desire, to the public echelons of association with power, 
dominance and abuse of authority.23 The term "rape as a weapon of war" thus refers to 
sexual violence as having a systematic, pervasive, or orchestrated aspect.24 
 
Moreover, feminist literature has highlighted the full range of harms resultant from the 
infliction of sexual violence. 25  These crimes produce pervasive and serious 
consequences, not only for the victims, but also for their surrounding communities.26 
Physical harm includes pain, injury, sexually transmitted infections, and the risk of 
infertility or unwanted pregnancy. Psychological trauma can include distress, shame, 
isolation and guilt, sleeping and eating disorders, depression, and a number of other 
behavioural disorders which can lead to self-harm or even suicide. Victims’ spouses, 
partners or children also experience the trauma of guilt, indignity or shame, particularly 
if they witnessed the attack. Victims may also be ostracized by their families or 
                                                        
20 Michelle Jarvis and Elena Martin Salgado "Future Challenges to prosecuting Sexual Violence Under 
International Law: Insights from ICTY Practice" in Anne-Marie de Brouwer, Charlotte Ku, Renée 
Römkens and Larissa van den Herik "(eds) Sexual Violence as an International Crime: Interdisciplinary 
Approaches (intersentia, Cambridge, 2013) 101 at 102.  
21 Lucy Fiske and Rita Shacke Ending Rape in War: How Far Have We Come? (Sydney Law School 
Legal Studies Research Paper No 15/21, March 2015) at 127; Peter Maurer "Q&A: The ICRC's Approach 
to Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict" (2014) IRRC 96(894) 449 at 450.  
22 Lucy Fiske and Rita Shacke, above n 21, at 127.   
23 Gloria Gaggioli "Sexual violence in armed conflicts: A violation of international human rights law and 
human rights law" (2014) IRRC 96(894) 503 at 503. 
24 Nicola Henry "The Fixation on Wartime Rape: Feminist Critique and International Criminal Law" 
[2014] S & LS 23(1) 93 at 94.  
25 Ni Aolain et al, above n 11, at 429.  
26 Rebecca L Haffajee "Prosecuting Crimes of Rape and Sexual Violence at the ICTR: the Application 
of Joint Criminal Enterprise Theory" (2006) Harvard JLG 29 201 at 218.  
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communities. 27  
Human experience and feminist literature has had some impact on international 
criminal law, such that the perception of sexual violence as an international crime 
worthy of prosecution advanced in the 20th century.28 Principally, the jurisprudence of 
the ad hoc war crimes tribunals has represented a step forward for sexual violence, 
through which these crimes have come to be seen as constituting war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, torture and an element of genocide.29 After initial strategic and 
investigation hurdles, the ICTY has established a robust body of prosecutions for sexual 
violence. 30   Moreover, the Rwanda Tribunal's marquee judgment in Akayesu 
significantly advanced the status of rape as a form of genocide, stating that such acts 
are of the "worst ways" to commit "infliction of serious bodily and mental harm on the 
victims."31 
 
However, despite advances championed by the ad hoc tribunals, international criminal 
law in relation to sexual violence continues to poignantly lag behind human experience. 
Jurisprudence as to interpretation and integration of gender concepts into international 
criminal law has been limited and inconsistent.32 Principally, sexual violence crimes 
are at a particular risk of failure of international criminal law to surpass pervasive 
assumptions about the nature of these crimes that holdover from the period up until the 
1990s in which men "neglected to enumerate, condemn and prosecute" sexual 
                                                        
27 Maurer, above n 21, at 450.  
28 Bianchi, above n 19  at 124. 
29 Navanethem Pillay "Address – Interdisciplinary Colloquium of Sexual Violence as International 
Crime: Sexual Violence: Standing by the Victim" (2012) 35(4) L & Soc Inquiry 847 at 848; Patricia 
Viseur Sellers "Individual(s') Liability for Collective Sexual Violence" in Karen Knop (ed) (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2004) 153 at 190. Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment); Prosecutor v Tadić 
(Judgment); Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) ICTY Trial Chamber IT-95-17/1-T, 10 December 
1998; Prosecutor v Delalić (Judgment) ICTY Trial Chamber IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998; 
Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) ICTY Trial Chamber IT-96-23-T, IT-96-23/1-T, 22 February 2001; 
Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment) ICTY Trial Chamber IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001; Prosecutor v Akayesu 
(Judgment) ICTR Trial Chamber I ICTR-96-4-T, September 1998. 
30 Niamh Hayes "Sisyphus Wept: Prosecuting Sexual Violence at the International Criminal Court" in 
William A Schabas,  Yvonne McDermott and Niamh Hayes (eds) The Ashgate Research Companion to 
International Law: Critical Perspectives (Ashgate, Surrey, 2013) 7 at 11. 
31 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR Trial Chamber I ICTR-96-4-T, September 1998 at [731].  
32 Brigid Inder, Executive Director Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice "A critique of the Katanga 
Judgment" (Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict, 11 June 2014) at 1; Susana Sacouto and 
Katherine Cleary "The importance of effective investigation of sexual violence and gender-based crimes 
at the International Criminal Court" (2009) Am Univ J Gen Soc Policy Law 17(2) 337 at 357. 
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violence.33 
Within the judicial structures of international criminal law there persists a public-
private dichotomy that assigns gendered domains to international law.34 In other words, 
historically, acts of sexual violence have been viewed as "a detour, a deviation, or the 
acts of renegade soldiers… pegged to private wrongs and [thus] not really the subject 
of international humanitarian law".35 This assumption is compounded by rape and other 
sexual assaults' explicit absence from the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions and the fundamental guarantees of Additional Protocol I.36 While progress 
has been made towards the view that sexual violence is something that is "public or 
political in the traditional sense" following discussion of the link between armed 
conflict and these crimes at the ICTY, sexual violence continues to be dogged by a 
subconscious bias towards the view that these crimes are "opportunistic" or unrelated 
to the wider ethnic conflict.37 
 
The hold-over conception of sexual violence as a private wrong may also be illustrated 
in the framing of international humanitarian law instruments that confine these crimes 
to evaluations based on the harm done to the victim's honour, modesty or chastity.38 
For example, the Fourth Geneva Convention describes rape, enforced prostitution and 
any form of indecent assault as an attack on a woman's "honour". 39  Moreover, 
Additional Protocols I and II categorise crimes of sexual violence as outrages on 
personal dignity, as distinct from acts of "violence to the life, health and physical or 
                                                        
33 Kelly D Askin "Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes Under International 
Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles" (2003) Berk J Int L 21(2) 288 at 295. Vincent 
Bernard and Helen Durham "Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: From Breaking the Silence to Breaking 
the Cycle" (2014) IRRC 96(894) 427 at 432; Jarvis and Salgado, above n 20, at 102. 
34 Sellers, above n 29, at 189.  
35Sacouto and Cleary, above n 32, at 347; Jarvis and Salgado, above n 20, at 102.  
36 Sellers, above n 29, at 190. 
37 See also Rhonda Copelon "Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against Women into 
International Criminal Law" (2000) McGill LJ 46 217 at 223. Sellers, above n 29, at 190. 
38 Valerie Oosterveld "Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal Court: Advancing International 
Law " (2004) Mich J Intl L 25 605 at 613; United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women 
Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict: United Nations Response (1998) (United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, April 1998) at 6. 
39 Alona Hagay-Frey Sex and Gender Crimes in the New International Law: Past, Present, Future 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2011) at 69; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) 75 UNTS 287 (opened for signature 12 
August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950), art 27.  
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mental well-being of persons". 40  Where the orthodox perception of harm at 
international law remains a vestige of historical male-dominated articulation, such 
framing directly reflects and reinforces the trivialisation of sexual violence crimes as 
compared with a "more serious" physical injury.41  For example, in the early days of 
the ICTY investigators were noted making such statements as: "I've got ten dead bodies, 
how do I have time for rape?"42 Similarly, at the establishment of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Human Rights Watch and the Fédération Internationale 
des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH) reported that there was a widespread 
perception among the Tribunal Investigators that rape is somehow a "lesser" or 
"incidental" crime not worth investigating.43  
 
The public-private dichotomy can also be drawn out of judgments within the 
international criminal judicial structure. To illustrate, when the ICC issued its first 
conviction against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, one of the founding members of the Union 
des Patriotes Conglais, despite the ample preliminary evidence of rape, other forms of 
sexual violence, torture, and mass murder, the Office of the Prosecutor instructed ICC 
investigators only to pursue evidence relating to the conscription and use of child 
soldiers. 44 The Office of the Prosecutor laid no charges for crimes of sexual violence. 
The Office gave no official reason for the failure to bring charges, but they have been 
mooted to include lack of resources and barriers to evidence.45 However, feminist 
academics and advocates slammed this decision, stating that this omission could have 
occurred because of the systemic belief that rape in war is the exception; and there was                                                         
40 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 1125 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 12 December 
1977, entered into force 7 December 1979), art 75(2); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II) 1125 UNTS 609 (opened for signature 12 December 1977, entered into force 7 December 
1978), art 4(2).   
41 Hagay-Frey, above n 39, at 3.  
42 deGuzman, above n 8, at 516. Peggy Kuo "Prosecuting Crimes of Sexual Violence in an International 
Tribunal" (2002) Case W Res J Intl L (34) 305 at 311. 
43 Copelon, above n 37, at 224. Human Rights Watch Africa, Human Rights Watch Women's Rights 
Project and Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme Shattered Lives: Sexual 
Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath (New York, Human Rights Watch, 1996).  
44 Prosecutor v Lubanga (Trial Judgment) ICC Trial Chamber I ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 March 2012; 
Hayes, above n 30, at 11. 
45 Lisa Gambone "Failure to Charge: The ICC, Lubanga and Sexual Violence Crimes in the DRC" (22 
July 2009) Foreign Policy Association <www.foreignpolicyblogs.com>; Letter from Brigid Inder 
(Executive Director of Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice) to Luis Moreno Ocampo (Chief 
Prosecutor International Criminal Court) regarding failure to bring charges for sexual violence in the 
Lubanga case (August 2006) at 6. 
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no indication that gender-based crimes were ever a serious subject of investigation, and 
that such investigations were "limited in scope, poorly directed and displayed a lack of 
commitment" to gather the evidence requisite for charges to be laid.46 Moreover, Judge 
Odio Benito issued a dissenting opinion expressing her criticism of failure to include 
sexual violence within the existing charges of child soldiers, stating that:47 
invisibility of sexual violence in the legal concept leads to discrimination of the 
victims… who systematically suffer from this crime as an intrinsic part of the 
involvement with the armed group. 
 
Similarly, sexual violence may be characterised as "incidental" or "opportunistic" in 
relation to other "core" crimes, and is instead rationalised on the basis of the 
perpetrator's lust, libidinal needs, or stress.48 An example of this perception is prevalent 
in the ICTR Rukundo case, in which a military chaplain was indicted for his role in the 
Rwandan genocide in 1994.49 Among other charges, Rukundo was charged with sexual 
assault for taking a young Tutsi refugee woman as an act of genocide. 50 At first 
instance, the Trial Chamber found Rukundo guilty of the sexual assault, and, given the 
"general context of mass violence against the Tutsi" and specifically that Rukundo 
stated that the woman's "entire family had to be killed for assisting the Inyenzi [Tutsi]", 
the assault occurred with genocidal intent.51 On appeal, the Appeals Chamber reversed 
this decision by holding that the sexual assault was "qualitatively different" from other 
acts of genocide perpetrated by Rukundo. In contrast to the "systematic, repeated 
searches" for Tutsis and the subsequent killing or assault of individuals, the Appeals 
Chamber found that Rukundo's sexual assault was "unplanned and spontaneous". 
Therefore, the sexual assault could "reasonably be construed as an opportunistic crime 
that was not accompanied by the specific intent to commit genocide".52  
 
                                                        
46 Gambone, above n 45; Inder, above n 45, at 6.  
47 Prosecutor v Lubanga (Separate and dissenting opinion of Judge Odio Benito) ICC Trial Chamber I 
ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, 14 March 2012 at [16].  
48 Patricia Viseur Sellers and Kaoru Okuizumi "International Prosecution of Sexual Assaults" (1997) 
Transnatl L & Contemp Probs 45 at 61-62. 
49 Prosecutor v Rukundo (Trial Judgment) ICTR Trial Chamber II ICTR-2001-70-T, 27 February 2009 
at [2].  
50 At [276].  
51 At [574]-[575]. 
52 Prosecutor v Rukundo (Appeal Judgment) ICTR Appeals Chamber ICTR-2001-70-A, 20 October 2010 
at [236].  
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Judge Pocar's dissent strongly highlights concerns in the position of the Appeals 
Chamber, stating that "[t]he core of the Majority's reasoning on this point indicates that 
it does not fully appreciate the seriousness of his crime" which is "not qualitatively 
different from other killings or serious bodily injury".53 Moreover, Pocar argued that 
the Majority's suggestion that the sexual assault was merely "opportunistic" did not 
fully appreciate the distinction between motive and intent, arguing that even where 
motive is entirely sexual, this does not mean that there is not intent to commit an act of 
torture or the conduct does not cause severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, since such pain or suffering is a "likely and logical consequence" of such 
conduct.54 As a result, Judge Pocar found that the sexual assault was of "similar gravity 
and fits squarely within [the] larger context of violence targeting Tutsis".55 Moreover, 
several commentators expressed disappointment with the Appeals Chamber's decision, 
including Clair Duffy, former Appeals Counsel for the Office of the Prosecutor at the 
ICTR, who described the Majority judgement as a "striking example of a step 
backwards in the field of gender justice."56  
 
This part has made some reference to the manner in which historical assumptions can 
lead to an inconsistent and limited interpretation and failure to engender legal concepts 
as applied to sexual violence crimes at international criminal trial. The following 
sections will seek to apply a similar critical lens to three very recent judgments from 
the ICC and ICTY.  
III Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute  
 
The Katanga judgment is illustrative of an incomplete interpretation of the law and 
integration of gender concepts into art 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute. This section will 
provide an overview of the law as it relates to art 25(3)(d) liability in order to set a 
foundation for an analysis of the Trial Chamber's reasoning in the Katanga case.  
                                                        
53 Prosecutor v Rukundo (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pocar) at [4].  
54 At [4], [10].  
55 At [11].  
56  Clair Duffy "Gender Crime Prosecution and the ICTR Legacy"  (2011) Australian Red Cross 
International Humanitarian Law Magazine (Australia, 2011) at 18. See also in support of Judge Pocar 
Chile Eboe-Osuji International Law and Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts (Brill, Leiden, 2012) at 
164; Valerie Oosterveld "The Influence of Domestic Legal Traditions on the Gender Jurisprudence of 
International Criminal Tribunals" (2013) CJICL 2(4) 825 at 843. 
 14 
 
In the context of trying senior political and military leaders for international crimes, it 
is often the case that these leaders have directed, or at least tolerated, a massive 
campaign of crimes. However, proving culpability to the criminal law standard is 
challenging and depends on a large and complex web of circumstantial evidence and 
inferences that can reasonably be drawn from this evidence.57  International crimes, 
moreover, often involve collective conduct dependent on the coordinated or 
simultaneous acts of multiple perpetrators acting with a collective criminal purpose.58  
 
To achieve a criminal conviction at the ICC, the Prosecutor must first prove, regardless 
of the collective nature of the acts, the commission of the underlying crime.59 The 
individual criminal responsibility of the accused is then triggered for individuals who, 
by means of formal or informal groups, participate in collective criminal conduct 
related to that crime.60 The Rome Statute is the treaty that establishes the International 
Criminal Court. Among other things, it sets out the crimes falling within the jurisdiction 
of the ICC, the modes of individual responsibility, and the rules of procedure. The 
modes of individual responsibility are contained in arts 25 and 28 of the Statute. Article 
25(3) differentiates clearly between four levels of participation: (a) commission; (b) 
instigation and ordering; (c) assistance; and, (d) contribution to a group crime.61 Article 
25(3)(a) concerns commission of the crime through several different levels: direct 
perpetration, where the accused directly commits the crime; co-perpetration, as 
commission of the crime jointly with another person; indirect perpetration, as 
commission through another person; and indirect co-perpetration, where the essential 
contribution assigned to a co-perpetrator is carried out by another person who does not 
share the common plan or through a hierarchical organisation. 62  Article 25(3)(b) 
concerns ordering, soliciting or inducing in terms of exerting influence on the direct 
perpetrator.63 Article 25(3)(c) aiding and abetting or otherwise assisting where the 
accused acts with intent and intends his or her conduct will facilitate and assist the 
                                                        
57 Jarvis and Salgado, above n 20, at 107.  
58 Bianchi, above n 19, at 124. 
59 Rome Statute, art 25. 
60 Art 25(3).    
61 Art 25.  
62  International Criminal Law Services Modes of Liability: Commission and Participation (United 
Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2011) at 20-23.  
63 At 7.  
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commission of the crime. 64 Article 25(3)(d) is residual or catch-all mode of liability 
that encompasses the broad category of "contribution in any other way to the crime 
committed by a group of persons acting with a common purpose."65 Article 28 provides 
for individual criminal responsibility through command responsibility, in which 
liability is imposed for a leader's omission to take necessary and reasonable measures 
to prevent and punish subordinates' offences.66  
 
The ICC Trial Chamber in Katanga used art 25(3)(d) as a form of commission through 
contribution to a common purpose to ground Katanga's liability for the alleged crimes. 
In full, art 25(3)(d) requires that the accused, in any way other than commission, 
instigation or assisting:67  
…contributed to the commission or attempted commission of [a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court] by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such 
contribution shall be intention and shall either:  
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose 
of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or  
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.  
 
A Actus Reus 
 
The objective elements are of art 25(3)(d) include:68 
(i) A crime within the jurisdiction of the Court is attempted or committed;  
(ii) The commission or attempted commission of such a crime was carried 
out by a group of persons acting with a common purpose;  
(iii) The individual contributed to the crime in any way other than those set 
out in Article 25(3)(a) to (c) of the Statute. 
 
                                                        
64 At 24.   
65 Rome Statute, art 25(3).  
66 Art 28.  
67 Art 25(3)(d).  
68 Prosecutor v Mbarushimana (Decision declining to confirm the charges) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I 
ICC-01/04-01/10, 16 December 2011 at [135].  
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The first objective requires a commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court 
and to date has not elicited significant discussion. 69 The objective and subjective 
elements specific to crimes and their contextual elements must be established.70  
 
As regards the second objective, the Mbarushimana Confirmation of Charges Decision 
found that a common purpose "must include an element of criminality" but did not need 
to be "specifically directed at the commission of a crime".71 The agreement need not be 
explicit, "and its existence can be inferred from the subsequent concerted action of the 
group of persons".72 
 
The ICC Trial Chamber in Katanga viewed the definition of common purpose to 
presuppose specification of the criminal goal pursued and its scope by pinpointing its 
temporal and geographic purview; the characteristics of the victim pursued; and the 
identity of the members of the group, although each person need not be identified by 
name. A group of persons acting with a common purpose may arise outside of a 
military, political or administrative structure. Proof that the common purpose was 
previously arranged or formulated is not required. It may materialise extemporaneously 
and be inferred from the subsequent concerted action of the group of persons.73 The 
Katanga Trial Chamber also emphasised that the accused's contribution must be 
towards crimes that fall within the common purpose. Crimes ensuing "solely from 
opportunistic acts by members of the group and which fall outwith the common 
purpose" cannot be attributed to the group's concerted plan.74 
 
The third objective requires contribution in any way other than the other articles of art 
25(3). The accused's contribution must be "significant" in the sense that conduct 
inconsequential and immaterial to the commission of the crime cannot be considered 
sufficient to constitute a contribution.75  The significance of a contribution is to be 
determined "by considering the person’s relevant conduct and the context in which this 
                                                        
69 Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice Modes of Liability (Expert Paper, November 2013) at 79.  
70 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment) at [1622].  
71 Prosecutor v Mbarushimana (Decision declining to confirm the charges), at [271].  
72 At [271].  
73 At [1626]. 
74 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment), at [1630]. 
75 Prosecutor v Mbarushimana (Decision declining to confirm the charges), at [277]-[278], [283];      
Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment), at [1632]. 
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conduct is performed". 76   This is a slightly lower standard than the "essential 
contribution" standard required for art 25(3)(d) co-perpetration and indirect co-
perpetration.77  Moreover, the accused will not be responsible for all of the crimes 
which formed the common purpose, but only those crimes that the accused contributed 
to.78 
 
B Mens Rea  
 
The subjective elements of art 25(3)(d) are:79  
(i) The contribution shall be intentional; and 
(ii) Shall either: 
a. Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal 
purpose of the group; or  
b. In the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime. 
 
Article 30 of the Statute is used to help define the requirements of intent and 
knowledge.80 It requires that criminal responsibility shall only lie where the material 
elements of a crime are committed with intent and knowledge.81 "Intent" will be found 
where: (a) in relation to conduct, the person means to engage in the conduct; and (b) in 
relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that 
it will occur in the ordinary course of events.82 "Knowledge" means "awareness that a 
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events".83  
 
As regards the first mens rea requirement, art 25(3)(d) demands that the contribution of 
the accused to the commission of the crime be intentional, in addition to one of the 
specific mental elements in the paragraphs (i) and (ii). In other words, it must be shown 
that the accused's contribution must be voluntary and performed in the awareness that 
such conduct contributed to the activities of the group of persons acting with a common                                                         
76 Prosecutor v Mbarushimana (Decision declining to confirm the charges), at [285]. 
77International Criminal Law Services, above n 62, at 23-24.  
78 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment), at [1619].  
79 Rome Statute, art 25(3)(d).  
80 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment), at [1638]. 
81 Rome Statute, art 30(1).  
82 Rome Statute, art 30(2).  
83 Art 30(3).   
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purpose.84 It need not be proven that the accused shared the group's intention to commit 
the crime.85  
 
As to the second mens rea requirement, noting its disjunctive nature, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in the Mbarushimana case found that knowledge was sufficient to incur 
liability under Article 25(3)(d). 86 Under this limb, the accused must be aware that the 
intention of the group to commit the crime existed when engaging in the conduct that  
constituted his or her contribution. 87  Knowledge of such circumstance must be 
established for each specific crime and knowledge of a general criminal intention will 
not suffice. Knowledge is inferred from the relevant facts and circumstances and must 
be connected to the group's intention to commit the specific crimes.88  
 
Literature generally regards the overriding concern with modes of liability concerning 
group crime as the need to flexibly account for group criminal dynamics while 
simultaneously avoiding the imposition of guilt by association, problems most 
commonly attributed to the level of contribution to the crime involved. For example, 
argument surrounding the appropriate level of contribution required, as a standard of 
significance or essential contribution.89 However, as the Katanga case analysis will 
illustrate, sexual violence is not at risk of over-inclusiveness, but under-inclusiveness: 
a risk of failure to appreciate how sexual violence crimes fit within the common purpose 
due to incomplete interpretation and engendering of the law of art 25(3)(d).90  
IV Trial of Sexual Violence at the ICC  
 
The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui is the first and only 
case including crimes of sexual violence that has completed full trial at the ICC.91 The                                                         
84 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment), at [1639]. 
85 At [1638].   
86 Prosecutor v Mbarushimana (Decision declining to confirm the charges) at [289]. 
87 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment), at [1641]. 
88 At [1642].  
89 Randle C DeFalco "Contextualizing Actus Reus under Article 25(3)(d) of the ICC Statute: Thresholds 
of Contribution" (2013) J Int Criminal Justice 11(4) 715 at 715.  
90 Jarvis and Salgado, above n 20, at 113.  
91 The Lubanga (Judgment) case discussed above failed to bring charges for sexual violence. Subsequent 
charges have been lodged for sexual violence in several cases: Prosecutor v Gombo (Confirmation of 
Charges) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II ICC-01/05-05/08, 15 June 2009, which is now at the trial stage; 
Prosecutor v Kenyatta (Confirmation of Charges) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II ICC-01/09-02/22, 23 
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case centred on an attack on the village of Bogoro in the Ituri region of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo by the Front des nationalistes et intégrationnistes (FNI) and 
the Force de résistance patriotique en Ituri (FRPI) on 24 February 2003. Katanga and 
Ngudjolo were the alleged commanders of the FRPI and FNI, respectively. On 21 
November 2012, Trial Chamber II severed the cases against Ngudjolo and Katanga.92 
Ngudjolo was charged with seven counts of war crimes and three counts of crimes 
against humanity.93 However, he was subsequently acquitted for all charges under art 
25(3)(a) as the Court concluded that the three key witnesses called by the Prosecution 
to establish Ngudjolo's authority as lead commander of the Lendu militia as required 
under that article were not credible. 94 The Appeals Chamber confirmed the Trial 
Chamber's reasoning.95  
 
Prosecutor v Katanga concerned the trial of Germain Katanga for his role as the 
commander of the Walendu-Bindi collectivité, which together with the FNI, attacked 
Bogoro in February 2003. Katanga was charged under art 25(3)(a) with seven counts 
of war crimes: wilful killing, directing an attack against a civilian population, 
destruction of property, pillaging, using child soldiers under the age of 15 years, sexual 
slavery and rape; and three counts of crimes against humanity: murder, sexual slavery, 
and rape.96 Only a majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber found that there was sufficient 
evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that during the attack on Bogoro, 
                                                        
January 2012, but charges were subsequently withdrawn, see Prosecutor v Kenyatta (Decision on the 
withdrawal of charges) ICC Trial Chamber V(B) ICC-01/09-02/11, 13 March 2015; Prosecutor v 
Gbagbo (Decision on the confirmation of charges) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-02/11-01/11, 12 June 
2014; Prosecutor v Ntaganda (Decision on the confirmation of charges) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II ICC-
01/04-02/06, 9 June 2014; Prosecutor v Mbarushimana (Decision declining to confirm the charges); 
Prosecutor v Gbagbo (Warrant of Arrest) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber III ICC-02/11-01/12, 29 February 
2012; Prosecutor v Harun (Warrant of Arrest) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-02/05-01/07, 27 April 
2007; Prosecutor v Kony (Warrant of Arrest) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II ICC-02/04-01/05, 27 September 
2005; Prosecutor v Al Bashir (Second Warrant of Arrest) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC-02/05-01/09, 12 
July 2010. 
92 Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 of the 
Regulations of the Court and severing the charges against the accused persons) ICC Trial Chamber II 
ICC-01/04-01/07, 21 November 2012.   
93 Prosecutor v Ngudjolo Chui (Trial Judgment) ICC Trial Chamber II ICC-01/04-02/12,18 December 
2012 at [7-10]. 
94 At [503].  
95 Prosecutor v Ngudjolo Chui (Appeal Judgment) ICC Appeals Chamber ICC-0104-02/12-A, 7 April 
2015. 
96 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment) at [7-10].  
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the sexual and gender-based violence crimes were jointly committed with the 
knowledge that they would occur in the ordinary course of events.97 
 
The Trial Chamber unanimously acquitted Katanga of all charges under 25(3)(a) 
liability.98 The Court found that the "absence of a centralised and effective chain of 
command" meant that the militia were not an organised apparatus of power or that 
Katanga had the extent of control requisite for liability under art 25(3)(a). 99 The 
majority, Judge Van den Wyngaert dissenting, then recharacterised the mode of liability 
for all charges except using child soldiers, in order to consider Katanga’s responsibility 
as an accessory to the crimes under Article 25(3)(d) of the Statute.100 It subsequently 
convicted Katanga as an accessory for the crimes of wilful killing, attacks against the 
civilian population, pillaging, and destruction of property.101 However, the Chamber 
acquitted Katanga as an accessory for the crimes of rape and sexual slavery.102  
A Actus Reus 
 
The Chamber established that the underlying crimes charged had been established as 
evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Ngiti combatants of the Walendu-
Bindi collectivité had committed the crimes.103  
 
It further recalled the finding that the combatants were part of a militia that constituted 
an organised armed group that had a plan to attack Bogoro and to "wipe out… not 
only the UPC military elements but also, and first and foremost, the Hema civilians 
present".104  The manner in which the village was attacked from all directions, that 
the villagers were "systematically targeted" in accordance with a "regular pattern and 
violence" confirmed the "existence of a common purpose of a criminal nature" with 
regard to the population of the village.105  
                                                        
97 At [10].  
98 At [1421].  
99 At [420].  
100 At [1484].  
101 At [1691].  
102 At [1664].  
103 At [1652].  
104 At [1401]-[1415], [1654].  
105 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment) at [1656]-[1657].  
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The Chamber next assessed Katanga's contribution to the commission of the crimes, 
concluding that Katanga had made a "truly significant" contribution to the crimes of 
murder, pillage and destruction of property by traveling to Beni on behalf of the Ngiti 
militia, establishing military alliances and defining a military strategy there; thereby 
helping the militia group by making a case to the military authorities for their 
interested in the struggle against the "Hema enemy"; assuming a position of authority 
and the role of facilitator, and settling disputes between local commanders and 
military authorities; and receiving and distributing arms and munitions. In this regard, 
it underscored Katanga's contribution to the preparations for the attack, and the 
importance of the arms and munitions he obtained for the success of the attack.106 
The Chamber then moved to consider which crimes fell within this common purpose. 
It found that the manner in which Bogoro was attacked and that in which Hema 
civilians "who had no part in combat, were pursued and killed" confirmed that murder 
as a crime against humanity and war crime and attack against civilians as a war crime 
were part of the common purpose. The scale of the crimes were emphasised, in which 
"villagers were targeted in a systematic manner" and the crimes were committed with 
"great violence".107 The Chamber found that at least 60 persons were killed during the 
attack, including at least 33 civilians.108 Moreover, the habitual nature of the conduct 
in the attack and thereafter confirms intent to commit those crimes. 109  
 
The Chamber also established that the militia intended to pillage property and 
livestock, in that they knew that such acts of pillaging would occur in the ordinary 
source of events during the attack.110 The scale of the crimes were again emphasised, 
such that Chamber stressed that the acts of destruction of property, including the 
burning down of houses occupied mainly by Hema civilians, "occurred within the full 
locality and during the whole day", and that Bogoro was pillaged "in great 
proportions". The Chamber added that goods destroyed and pillaged, including sheet 
metal roof covering and livestock, belonged mainly to the Hema civilian population 
and were "essential to [their] daily life".111                                                         
106 At [1671]-[1672], [1676], [1679], [1681]. 
107 At [1656]. 
108 At [838]-[840], [869]. 
109 At [1658].  
110 At [1662].  
111 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment) at [1659]-[1660].  
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Two paragraphs dismissed Katanga's criminal responsibility for the crimes of rape 
and sexual slavery.112 The Chamber concluded that the crimes did not fall within the 
common purpose.113 It firstly recalled that that women claimed to be non-Hema so as 
to be spared certain death and that they were sexually enslaved.114 The Chamber found 
that there was no evidence to establish that the sexual violence crimes were committed 
"on a wide scale and repeatedly" during the attack, or that the "obliteration of the 
village of Bogoro perforce entailed commission of such acts". 115 Moreover, the Court 
found that it was not established that rape or sexual slavery had been committed by 
the Ngiti combatants before the attack on Bogoro.116 Finally, the Chamber found that 
"women who were raped, abducted and enslaved were specifically spared" and evaded 
certain death by claiming to be other than of Hema ethnicity."117 Accordingly, rape 
and sexual slavery did not fall within the common purpose and Katanga was acquitted 
for their commission.118 
B Mens Rea  
The Chamber established that Katanga intended to contribute to the common purpose 
due to Katanga's testimony that his acts were made with awareness, that he had a part 
in the attack's conception, and that he voluntarily remained during the assault on 
Bogoro and considered it his "duty" to take part in the operation.119 
 
Concerning Katanga's knowledge of the group's intent to commit the crimes, the 
Chamber found that the evidence demonstrated that he knew of the plan to attack 
Bogoro as of November 2002 and knew that the arms and munitions, the delivery of 
which he facilitated, would be used in that attack.120 It further found that he was aware 
of the nature of the war in Ituri during the period and the ensuing suffering of the 
civilian population, including specific instances of murder and property damage in 
                                                        
112 At [1663]-[1664]. 
113 At [1664]. 
114 At [1663].  
115 At [1663].  
116 At [1663]-[1664]. 
117 At [1663].   
118 At [1664].  
119 At [1682].  
120 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment) at [1684].  
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which his militia had participated.121 Finally, the Chamber found that Katanga knew 
about, and ‘fully shared’, the Ngiti's anti-Hema ideology.122 Thus, the Chamber found 
beyond reasonable doubt that Katanga significantly and intentionally contributed to 
the crimes of murder as a war crime and a crime against humanity, as well as attacking 
a civilian population, destruction of property and pillage as war crimes, in full 
knowledge of the group's intention to commit the crimes.123  
 
Judge Van den Wyngaert dissented on two principle grounds. The first was that the 
recharacterisation of the facts violates arts 74 and 67 of the Rome Statute and therefore 
was not open to the Trial Chamber.124 The Judge argued that the recharacterisation of 
the facts went well beyond the facts and circumstances of the Confirmation Decision 
and failed to respect Katanga's rights to a fair trial.125 Secondly, Judge Van den 
Wyngaert dissented fundamentally on the reading of the evidence as a whole, finding 
that the evidence as to art 25(3)(d) liability was insufficient to meet the standard of 
beyond reasonable doubt.126 While her comments were not directed specifically at 
sexual violence crimes, she does provide a poignant warning against relaxation of 
legal standards:127  
Sympathy for the victim's plight and an urgent awareness that this Court is called 
upon to "end impunity" are powerful stimuli. Yet, the Court's success or failure 
cannot be measured just in terms of "bad guys" being convicted and innocent victims 
receiving reparation. Success or failure is determined first and foremost by whether 
or not the proceedings, as a whole, have been fair and just. 
 
C Analysis 
 
The Majority's failure to consider sexual violence as a crime within the common 
purpose can be attributed to a inconsistent and limited assessment of the law and 
failure to engender legal concepts: sexual violence was implicitly subjected to a 
                                                        
121 At [1685]-[1689]. 
122 At [1688]. 
123 At [1691]. 
124 Prosecutor v Katanga (Minority Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert) ICC Trial Chamber 
II ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-AnxI, 7 March 2014 at [2].  
125 At [129]-[132].  
126 Prosecutor v Katanga (Minority Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert) at [317].  
127 At [310].  
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higher evidentiary standard than other violent crimes; fails to apply the same legal 
standards to sexual violence as other violent crimes; the scale of sexual violence 
crimes failed to be assessed through a gender lens; and the judgment lacks 
appreciation for the established link between sexual violence and ethnic conflict. 128 
 
First, the Majority judgment is illustrative of inconsistency between application of the 
law to sexual violence as compared with other violent crimes in three instances.129 First, 
while the majority accepted that rape and sexual slavery form part of the Ngiti 
strategies, it held that they were not instrumental in the taking of the village of 
Bogoro.130 This reasoning implies that physical destruction carried greater weight in 
the purpose than the destruction of community structures through acts of sexual 
violence. 131  Second, majority decision found that the intensity of the fire power 
deployed in the attack "compelled [the civilian population] to flee, leaving it vulnerable 
to shooting and forcing it to abandon its property".132 However, the Chamber did not 
consider the terrorizing impact of sexual violence upon the civilian population, or that 
attempts by the population to flee may have also made it vulnerable to rape, capture 
and enslavement.133 Finally, according to the majority, transporting, stockpiling and 
distributing weapons and ammunition demonstrated planning, intent and preparation 
for the attack and proved Katanga’s contribution to the common purpose. 134 The 
majority also explicitly connected the amassing and distribution of weapons with the 
combatants to commit the crimes of murder, destruction of property, pillaging and an 
attack on the civilian population.135 Such analysis begs the question: if not this, what 
form of contribution would the court require to demonstrate the intent to commit sexual 
violence, in order for this crime to be considered part of the common purpose?136                                                          
128 Brigid Inder "Expert Panel: Prosecuting Sexual Violence in Conflict – Challenges and Lessons 
Learned: a Critique of the Katanga Judgment" (Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict, 11 
June 2014) at 1. 
129 Kelly Askin "Katanga Judgment Underlines Need for Stronger ICC Focus on Sexual Violence" (11 
March 2014) Open Society Foundations < <www.opensocietyfoundations.org>. 
130 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment) at [1663]-[1664].  
131 Carsten Stahn "Justice Delivered or Justice Denied? The Legacy of the Katanga Judgment" (2014) 
JICJ 12(4) 809 at 821. Linnea Kortfelt "Sexual Violence and the Relevance of the Doctrine of Superior 
Responsibility in the Light of the Katanga Judgment at the International Criminal Court" (2015) Nord J 
Intl L 4 533 at 546.  
132Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment), at [1678].  
133 Inder, above n 128, at 4. See Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) ICTY Trial Chamber IT-96-23-T, IT-
96-23/1-T. 
134 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment), at [1672]-[1673]. 
135 At [1676]-[1681]. 
136 Inder, above n 128, at 4. 
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Secondly, in articulating the common plan, the Majority relied in part upon the volume 
of the crimes of murder and pillaging to establish that these crimes were part of the 
common plan. According to the judgment, more than 60 people were killed in the 
attack, destruction of property occurred on a grand scale, and pillaging was 
widespread.137 Three women testified to being raped multiple times and, according to 
their testimonies, at least 17 acts of rape were committed during the attack.138  However, 
while the Majority accepted that rape and sexual slavery crimes had been committed 
during the attack, the insufficient number of these crimes was a factor that led the 
Majority to conclude that these crimes were not part of the common purpose.139 This 
finding is in conflict with a body of jurisprudence relating to common purpose liability 
at the ICTY despite the Katanga Trial Chamber stating that ICTY common purpose 
jurisprudence is of the "utmost pertinence" to the art 25(3)(d) analysis. 140  ICTY 
jurisprudence suggests that the argument that the number of crimes committed fall short 
of showing that that crime was part of the common purpose is fallacious and is to 
conflate the objective of the joint criminal enterprise with the means through which it 
was to be achieved.141 Moreover, the issue of numbers is complex, as Inder states "for 
what we count and how we count it reflects what we value".142 To find that the number 
of sexual assaults confine these crimes to fall outwith the common purpose fails to 
comprehensively recognise the wider range of harms elicited by these crimes.143 
 
Thirdly, in its finding of the existence of a common purpose and Katanga's contribution 
to that common purpose, the Chamber found that the sexual violence crimes were not 
ethnically motivated and were not an integral part of the plan to wipe out the Bogoro 
village.144 Such a conclusion refutes the body of jurisprudence from the ICTY and 
ICTR which establish that sex and gender crimes are commonly used and effective 
                                                        
137 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment), at [841], [950]. 
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means through which ethnically motivated attacks may be undertaken.145 Notably, the 
majority stated that "women who were raped, abducted and turned to slavery had their 
life spared and escaped a certain death because they pretended to belong to an ethnicity 
other than Hema".146 This conclusion clearly reinforces the traditional hierarchy of 
crimes at international law.147 Moreover, if the comment was to contrast the common 
purpose as confined to the targeting of the UPC and Hema population with sexual 
violence directed at women who claimed to be non-Hema, this section of the judgment 
is confusing and unprincipled as  the Chamber on multiple occasions held that the 
common purpose was to destroy the village in its entirety and drive out the civilians.148 
 
Lastly, the Chamber did not consider dolus directus in the second degree as regards 
rape and sexual slavery, meaning whether Katanga knew that in the ordinary source of 
the attack, crimes of sexual violence would occur.149 However, such an analysis was 
undertaken in regard to pillaging and destruction of property, finding these crimes 
within the common purpose as Katanga was found to know that these crimes would be 
committed in the ordinary course of events.150 It is arguable that the Chamber's finding 
that it had not been sufficiently demonstrated that the Ngiti combatants involved in the 
attack on Borogo had committee sexual violence prior to this incident goes to the 
foreseeability in the ordinary course of events.151 However, the finding that it was not 
established that the combatants had committed rapes and crimes of sexual slavery 
before the attack on Bogoro was established without sufficient or transparent analysis 
as cited only the Defence closing submissions and did not consider the Pre-Trial 
Chamber finding to the contrary.152   
D Response of the Office of the Prosecutor   
In July 2014, the Prosecutor's Office released a policy paper on sex and gender-based 
crimes to affirm the Office's commitment to an emphasis on sexual and gender-based                                                         
145 See eg Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment); Prosecutor v Tadić (Judgment); Prosecutor v Furundžija 
(Judgment), above n 29; Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) above n 29; Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment) 
above n 29.  
146 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment), at [1663]. 
147 Inder, above n 128, at 7. 
148 Korrtfalt, above n 131, at 547.  
149 Inder, above n 128, at 7. 
150 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment), at [1662], [1690]-[1691].  151 Korrtfalt, above n 131, at 546. 
152 At Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment) footnote 3677; Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui 
(Decision on confirmation of charges) at [568]. Stahn, above n 131, at 821.  
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crimes, and to provide guidance on effective investigation and prosecution, contribute 
to advancing a culture of best practice, and contribute to the ongoing development of 
international jurisprudence. 153 The policy was the result of a two-year process of 
extensive internal and external consultations.154  The Office made several prudent 
comments as to how to improve the prosecution of sexual violence at international 
criminal law.  
 
First, the Office addressed the manner in which crimes are charged. The burden of 
deciding which charges to bring is that of the Prosecutor's, and as such the Office stated 
that it will ensure that charges for sexual and gender-based crimes are brought wherever 
there is sufficient evidence to support such charges.155 This is to be achieved directly, 
by charging such acts as crimes in and of themselves, and indirectly, through charging 
these acts as forms of other violence within the Court's jurisdiction where the material 
elements are met, such as torture, persecution, and genocide. 156  The Office also 
confirmed its commitment to charge acts of sexual violence as different categories of 
crimes – war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide - within the Court's 
jurisdiction, in order to "properly describe the nature, manner of commission, intent, 
impact, and context".157 
 
Second, the Office addressed the manner in which modes of liability and mental 
elements are brought an established in order to secure conviction. The Office noted that 
situations before the Court have tended to show that sex and gender violence crimes 
are often widespread and used systematically as a "tool of war or repression".158 Such 
is a distinctly positive development as it shows that the Office of the Prosecutor is 
beginning to shake off the historical assumptions that reduce sexual violence to the 
private sphere.  
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Thirdly, the Office stated that these crimes may be committed as a result of explicit or 
implicit orders; as a consequence which the individual is aware will occur in the 
ordinary course of events during military operations, for instance, as a result of 
omission to protect civilians, or failure to punish similar crimes; or by a combination 
of other relevant factors, such as a culture of tolerance.159 The Office also noted that 
the experience of the ICC and other international tribunals demonstrates that there is 
often no evidence of orders to commit sexual and gender violence and, in such 
circumstances, evidence such as patterns of prior or subsequent conduct or specific 
notice may be adduced to prove an awareness on the part of the accused that such crimes 
would occur in the ordinary course of events, which would satisfy the mental element 
of art 30(2)(b).160 
 
The acknowledgement of the Office of the Prosecutor that new approaches must be 
taken towards the prosecution of sexual violence reflects leadership in the development 
of a more gender-inclusive approach to the application of international criminal law. 
This kind of approach is crucial in order to meaningfully address impunity for sexual 
violence crimes in armed conflict.161 Moreover, elevation of sexual violence crimes 
increases the prospects of justice for survivors in post-conflict reconstruction.162 In 
practical terms, the Office is to "systematically" ensure the inclusion of charges for 
sexual and gender-based crimes in cases.163 Bensouda gave the example that the Office 
is working to advance international humanitarian law in the case of Bosco Ntaganda by 
bringing charges in relation to sexual violence against one's own troops.164 Moreover, 
in the case of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, acts of sexual violence became to focus of 
the investigations and prosecutions.165  
V Joint Criminal Enterprise   
                                                        
159 At [75].  
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Having drawn out the inconsistent and limited jurisprudence interpretation of the law 
and engendering of the legal concepts of individual criminal responsibility at the ICC, 
the following parts will apply a similar analysis to two very recent appellate cases at 
the ICTY: Šainović and Đorđević. This part will provide an outline of the law of joint 
criminal enterprise, as the mode of common purpose liability applied in these cases, in 
order to provide a foundation from which the analysis of these cases can begin.  
 
The Statute of the ICTY obliges the Prosecutor to prove, regardless of the collective 
nature of the acts, the underlying crime.166 Personal jurisdiction is then triggered for 
individuals accused who, by means of formal or informal groups, participate in 
collective criminal conduct.167 This may include personal commission, or liability for 
actions conducted by others.168  
 
Although the Statute of the ICTY makes no explicit reference to "joint criminal 
enterprise" as a mode of liability, the Appeals Chamber has held that participation in a 
joint criminal enterprise is a form of commission under art 7(1) of the Statute.169 Joint 
criminal enterprise confers criminal responsibility on a defendant for his or her 
participation in a group's common plan to embark on criminal activity that is then 
carried out either jointly or by some members of this plurality of persons. Anyone who 
contributes to the criminal activity in order to carry out a common criminal purpose 
may be held criminally liable.170  
 
Notably, the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Lubanga decision held that the concept of joint 
criminal enterprise formulated by the ICTY is "closely akin" to art 25(3)(d) of the Rome 
Statute.171 In addition, the Appeals Chamber in Tadić referred to Article 25(3)(d) as 
incorporating a substantially similar concept to joint criminal enterprise.172 The extent 
to which art 25(3)(d) liability overlaps is debatable. However, the ICC has rejected joint                                                         
166 Sellers, above n 29, at 153.  
167At 154.   
168 Sofia Lord "Joint Criminal Enterprise and the International Criminal Court" (Thesis, Stockholm 
University, 2013) at 11.  
169 Prosecutor v Kvocka (Appeal Judgment) ICTY Appeals Chamber IT-98-30/1-A, 28 February 2005 at 
[79], [334].  
170 Prosecutor v Tadic (Appeal Judgment), above n 7, at [190]. 
171 Prosecutor v Lubanga (Decision on the confirmation of charges) ICC Pre Trial Chamber I ICC-01/04-
01/06, 29 January 2007 at [335]. 
172 Prosecutor v Tadić (Judgment) at [222]. 
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criminal enterprise, instead favouring art 25(3) as an exhaustive list of the modes of 
liability available.173 
 
A Actus reus 
 
The actus reus requirements for all categories of joint criminal enterprise are identical, 
requiring: 174  
i. A plurality of persons  
ii. The existence of a common plan, design or purpose, which amounts to or 
involves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute of the Court 
or Tribunal; and  
iii. Participation of the accused in the common design involving the 
perpetration of one of the crimes provided for in the Statute. Participation 
need not involve commission of a specific crime, but make take the form 
of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution of the common plan or 
purpose. 
 
As regards the first requirement, the group of persons must be identified, however it is 
not necessary to identify every person by name and it is not necessary that the people 
in the group know one another.175 They need not be organised in a military, political, 
or administrative structure.176 
 
The second requirement considers the existence of a common plan, design or purpose 
that amounts to or involves the commission of a crime within the Statute of the Court. 
A joint criminal enterprise may exist whenever two or more people participate in a 
common criminal endeavour. The common plan itself need not amount to a crime, but 
its execution must involve the commission of crimes. There is no necessity for this plan, 
design or purpose to have been previously arranged or formulated and it may 
materialise extemporaneously. It will be inferred from the fact that a plurality of persons 
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acts in unison to put into effect a joint criminal enterprise. 177 The framing of the 
common purpose has implications for the liability of the accused at trial.  
 
The third criteria requires the participation of the accused in the execution of the 
common design. Participation of an accused in the joint criminal enterprise need not 
involve the physical commission of the material elements of the crime, as long as the 
accused contributes to the execution of the common objective. 178  Although the 
contribution need not be necessary or substantial, it should at least be a significant 
contribution to the crimes charged.179  
 
B Mens Rea 
 
The mens rea requirements, or the mental elements of the crime, differ according to the 
category of joint criminal enterprise under consideration.180 
 
Basic joint criminal enterprise requires the intent to perpetrate a certain crime that was 
part of the common purpose. The accused does not have to physically perpetrate the 
crime, he or she only needed to have voluntarily participated in one aspect of the 
common design and intended the result.181 For crimes that in addition to the general 
subjective element also require an ulterior intent (dolus specialis) such as genocide, the 
participant in the basic joint criminal enterprise also must be motivated by an ulterior 
intent.182 
 
The second category – "systemic joint criminal enterprise" – embraces the specific 
subject matter of concentration camps.183 The mens rea requirement comprises: (i) 
knowledge of the nature of the system; and (ii) the intent to further the common 
concerted design to ill-treat inmates. In these cases, the requisite intent could be inferred 
from the position of authority held by the camp personnel or organized hierarchy. The 
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individual's high rank or authority, in and of itself, indicates an awareness of the 
common design and intent to participate therein.184  
 
The third category is extended joint criminal enterprise. This category concerns cases 
involving a common design to pursue one course of conduct where one of the 
perpetrators commits and act which, while outside the common design, was 
nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of effecting that common 
purpose.185 It need not be shown that there was intent to commit crimes that were 
outside the common purpose. Rather, what is required is the intention to participate in 
and further the criminal purpose and to contribute to the joint criminal enterprise. 
Responsibility for a crime other than the one agreed upon in the common play arises 
only if, under the circumstances of the case, it was: (i) foreseeable that such a crime 
might be perpetrated by one or other members of the group and (ii) the accused 
willingly took that risk. 186  Extended joint criminal enterprise does not require a 
"probability" that a crime would be committed, only that the possibility of a crime being 
committed is substantial enough that it is foreseeable to the accused.187 The Tadic 
Appeals Chamber gave the following example:188  
…the participants must have had in mind the intent, for instance, to ill-treat prisoners 
of war (even if such a plan arose extemporaneously) and one or some members of the 
group must have actually killed them. In order for responsibility for the deaths to be 
imputable to the others, however, everyone in the group must have been able to predict 
this result.  
 
The Tadic Appeals Chamber emphasised that more than negligence is required for 
liability under basic joint criminal enterprise, which rather requires a standard of 
advertant recklessness. The criterion to establish advertant recklessness can be 
summarized as follows:189  
i. the intention to take part in and further the initial criminal purpose of a joint 
criminal enterprise; 
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ii. that the crime charged was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the 
execution of that enterprise; and  
iii. that the accused was aware that such a crime was a possible consequence 
of the execution of that enterprise, and that, with that awareness, he 
participated in that enterprise. 
 
Since the Tribunal in Tadic first mooted the theory of joint criminal enterprise it has 
become what Schabas has described as the "magic bullet" of the Office of the 
Prosecutor, raising concern regarding the potential for broad interpretation of its 
liability-imposing provisions.190  The doctrine has been criticised for its "elasticity" and 
"dangerously illiberal tendencies" that leave defendants potentially liable for a vast 
range of crimes.191 For example, in the Kraijisnik case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
found it necessary to overrule the Trial Chamber adoption of an articulation of the 
composition of the common criminal group as "impermissibly vague".192 Similarly, the 
adoption of a requirement for "significant contribution" to the joint criminal enterprise 
is an attempt by the Tribunal to balance the principal of personal culpability while also 
retaining sufficient flexibility to address the unique circumstances of group crimes.193 
Moreover, Schabas has raised concerns of a  "negligence-like standard of guilt" that 
increases the risk the accused will be found liable for guilt by association.194 The 
implications of guilt by association was outlined in the first Annual Report of the 
Tribunal, which stated:195  
If responsibility for the appalling crimes perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia is not 
attributed to individuals, then whole ethnic and religious groups will be held 
accountable for these crimes and branded as criminal. In other words, "collective 
responsibility" - a primitive and archaic concept - will gain the upper hand; eventually 
whole groups will be held guilty of massacres, torture, rape, ethnic cleansing, the 
wanton destruction of cities and villages. The history of the region clearly shows that 
clinging to feelings of "collective responsibility" easily degenerates into resentment,                                                         
190 Schabas,"Mens Rea and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" (2003) 37(4) 
New Eng L Rev 1015 at 1032. 
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hatred and frustration and inevitably leads to further violence and new crimes. 
V Trial of Sexual Violence at the ICTY 
 
 
The ICTY was established in an international environment that encouraged the pursuit 
of justice for sexual violence crimes in armed conflict.196 The United Nations Security 
Council had singled rape out as one of the particularly reprehensible crimes committed 
during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and expressed its commitment to 
establishing accountability for these crimes as a core part of the ICTY's mandate.197  
 
Jurisprudence of the ICTY confirmed that sexual violence is among the most serious 
crimes of war.198 Additionally, convictions for sexual violence at the ICTY have been 
secured as an integral part of the ethnic cleansing campaigns.199 Notably, in the Broanin 
case, the Appeals Chamber expressly dismissed defence arguments that rapes were 
"individual domestic crimes" unconnected to the armed conflict and to the widespread 
or systematic attack against the civilian population.200 It found that the rapes of Bosnian 
Muslim women by Bosnian Serb soldiers and placement occurred in the context of the 
armed conflict and as part of a widespread or systematic attack.201  
 
In limited cases, sexual violence has been found to consist part of the common purpose: 
under the first category of joint criminal enterprise through persecution202 and the 
second category of joint criminal enterprise at first instance.203 However, it is more 
often that sexual violence has fallen to be considered under the third category of joint 
criminal enterprise, as illustrated in the two cases that will next be analysed.204 
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A Šainović  
 
The Milutinovic case involved six accused tried concerning ethnic cleansing of Kosovar 
Albanians in 1999. Specifically, the accused were alleged responsible for deportation, 
forcible transfer, murder and persecution as crimes against humanity, and murder as a 
war crime. 205  Four of the accused appealed the verdict of the Trial Chamber in 
Milutinovic, leading to the appeal judgment delivered in Šainović in 2014.206 
 
1 Actus reus  
 
The Trial Chamber established that the requirement of a plurality of persons acting in 
the joint criminal enterprise was established.207  
 
Secondly, the Trial Chamber established that the group operated with a common 
purpose to ensure the FRY and Serbian authority's continued control over Kosovo: 
through "a widespread and systematic campaign of terror and violence, the Kosovo 
Albanian population was to be forcibly displaced both within and without Kosovo.208 
It considered the destruction of Kosovar Albanian identity documents, the disarming of 
Kosovo Albanians and the arming of Serbs and Montenegrins, attempts to obstruct 
justice and partial responsibility for the failure of international peace negotiations were 
suggestive of this common purpose.209 Moreover, the Court looked to the wider context 
of historical and political ethnic divides, including "widespread and systemic" attacks 
to create an "atmosphere of terror" including the "excessive use of force".210 
 
The Trial Chamber concluded that the common purpose was to be achieved through 
deportation and forcible transfer alone.211  While the Trial Chamber found murders, 
sexual assaults and destruction of property was established beyond reasonable doubt, 
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given that there was no clear pattern of murder, sexual assault and destruction of 
property, the Trial Chamber was not satisfied these fell within the common purpose.212 
 
Following establishment of the first two actus reus requirements, the Court moved on 
to individually assess the third physical requirement, as being a significant contribution, 
and the mens rea requirements individually.213 This brief will consider three accused 
whose charges are relevant to sexual assault: Pavković, Šainović, and Lukić. 
 
2 Mens rea 
 
(a) Pavković 
 
Pavković was Commander of the 3rd Army of the VJ.  
 
The Trial Chamber established that all of Pavković's actions were voluntary and that he 
had the intent to ensure continued control by the FRY and Serbian authorities over 
Kosovo through the crimes of forcible displacement.214 
 
It was established that Pavković intended to participate in the common purpose and that 
his contribution was significant.215  Pavković possessed extensive de jure powers and 
command authority over VJ forces, and influence that extended further. The Chamber 
found that information received by Pavković before and during the NATO air campaign 
combined with his continuing ordering of and participation in the joint operations and 
awareness of "allegations of excessive and indiscriminate use of force" by the 
international community was indicative of his intent that the crimes occur. 216  
Pavković's "frequent presence" on the ground, in conjunction with the "widespread 
practice" of displacing Kosovo Albanians and "ill-discipline and misconduct" amongst 
VJ members, supports the contention that he was aware of criminal offences. 217  
Pavković also engaged in under-reporting of crimes, arming of the non-Albanian                                                         
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population and disarming of the Kosovo Albanian population, and "ineffective 
measures" to protect civilians that were "manifestly insufficient" and "contributed to 
the creation and maintenance of an environment of impunity".218 
 
The Court established that murders and sexual assaults were foreseeable to Pavković 
as it placed the commission of crimes within the wider ethnic armed conflict. Pavković 
was "aware of the strong animosity" between the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians and of 
the context in which the displacement took place and his "detailed knowledge of events 
on the ground" coupled with knowledge of specific instances of murder and rape 
committed by these forces made it reasonably foreseeable that VJ and MUP forces 
would commit murder and sexual assault during the forcible displacement in Beleg and 
Cirez.219 
 
The Appeals Chamber confirmed the Trial Chamber's reasoning and, given Pavković's 
awareness and specific knowledge of the widespread criminal violence committed 
against the Kosovo Albanian population, widened Pavković's liability to include sexual 
assaults committed in Prishtina in April and May 1999.220 This Appeals Chamber 
decision has been considered an example of successful conviction for sexual violence 
crimes and a step towards ending impunity at the supranational level.221 
(b) Šainović and Lukić 
 
Šainović was a Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY.222 The Trial Chamber established 
that Šainović contributed significantly to the joint criminal enterprise as his role was to 
"orchestrate" the events in Kosovo by conveying Milosevic's instructions and co-
ordinating the VJ and MUP.223 Lukić was the Head of the MUP Staff for Kosovo.224 
The Trial Chamber also concluded that Lukić's contribution was significant because he 
was a directly involved in day-to-day operations as de facto commander over MUP 
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forces, acted as a bridge between policy planners such as Milosevic and Đorđević, and 
those on the ground in Kosovo.225  
 
The Chamber established that Šainović's actions were voluntary.226 It also concluded 
that, given his awareness of the humanitarian catastrophe but continued participation in 
the joint criminal enterprise, he had the intent to forcibly displace part of the Kosovo 
Albanian population.227 The Trial Chamber also established that Lukić's actions were 
voluntary and he had intent to participate in the common purpose given his specific 
awareness of the large numbers of civilians leaving Kosovo and the large number of 
crimes being committed by MUP and VJ members.228 
 
As regards to murder, the Trial Chamber established that Šainović and Lukić were   
aware of the "strong animosity" between ethnic Serbs and Kosovo Albanians and of the 
context in which the forcible displacement took place, and each possessed "detailed 
knowledge of events on the ground". It was thus reasonably foreseeable that murder 
would be committed.229  Specific evidence drawn from meetings in which Šainović was 
informed of and personally discussed mass graves and killing supported his 
conclusion.230  
 
The Trial Chamber also found that destruction of or damage to religious property was 
reasonably foreseeable to both Šainović and Lukić as the conflict was one that involved 
ethnic divisions and, moreover, the common purpose was to be achieved through a 
campaign of terror and violence against the Kosovo Albanian civilian population. These 
conditions coupled with their "detailed knowledge" of events on the ground provided 
the "inescapable conclusion" was that such damage was reasonably foreseeable.231  
 
However, the Trial Chamber considered that the evidence did not establish sexual 
assaults were reasonably foreseeable to either of the accused. It found that sexual 
offences were only discussed at meetings at which Šainović attended after those crimes                                                         
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had been committed in Beleg and Cirez. 232 Similarly, despite Lukić submitting a report 
detailing the sexual assault of a Kosovo Albanian woman in May 1999, the evidence 
did not demonstrate that sexual assaults committed in March and April were reasonably 
foreseeable to him.233 Moreover, as regards both accused, the evidence in Krstic and 
Kvocka findings were "significantly more compelling" than those in relation to this 
case. Therefore, both were acquitted on grounds of lack of foreseeability.234 
 
Krstic involved the conviction of General Krstic, Commander of the Drina Corps of the 
VRS, as a member of a joint criminal enterprise to forcibly transfer the bulk of Bosnian 
Muslim civilians out of Srebrenica.235 The Trial Chamber was satisfied that murders, 
rapes, beatings and sexual violence committed against refugees "inevitable" given the 
Krstic's firsthand knowledge of the lack of shelter, density of the crowds, vulnerable 
conditions of the refugees, the presence of many regular and irregular military and 
paramilitary units, and lack of sufficient numbers of UN soldiers. 236 The Appeals 
Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber's reasoning. 237  Moreover, the accused in the 
Kvocka et al. case were found responsible for persecutions, including through rape and 
sexual assault, committed in the Omarska death camp in Prijedor.238 Although the 
accused were found guilty at trial level under systemic joint criminal enterprise, the 
Trial Chamber stated:239  
 
…any crimes that were natural and foreseeable consequences of the joint criminal 
enterprise of the Omarska camp, including sexual violence, can be attributable to the 
participants in the criminal enterprise. In Omarska camp, approximately 36 women 
were held in detention guarded by men with weapons who were often drunk, violence 
and physically and mentally abusive and who were allowed to act with virtual 
impunity. Indeed, it would be unrealistic and contrary to all rational logic to expect that 
none of the women held in Omarska, placed in circumstances rendering them especially 
vulnerable, would be subjected to rape or other forms of sexual violence. 
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Judge Chowhan of the Trial Chamber in Milutinovic issued a partially dissenting 
opinion regarding the foreseeability of sexual assault of Kosovo Albanian women to 
Šainović and Lukić. Chowhan stated that in the context of armed conflict in which 
"able-bodied military and security forces" use violence to remove civilians from their 
homes, "prudence and common sense" as well as the past history of the conflicts in the 
region give the result that sexual assaults "were certainly foreseeable realities".240  
 
The Appeals Chamber reversed both Šainović and Lukić's acquittals for sexual violence 
charges.241 The Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, found that in light of the 
accused's awareness of the atmosphere of aggression, violence and ethnic animosity, 
and the forcible displacement of Kosovo Albanian women rending them especially 
vulnerable, both Šainović and Lukić "must have been aware" that sexual assaults could 
be committed on discriminatory grounds.242 Judge Liu considered that the Majority's 
reliance on the totality of the circumstances to find that commission of sexual assaults 
were foreseeable as "unpersuasive and speculative" and does not reflect the only 
reasonable conclusion on the facts.243 
 
3 Analysis 
 
The Trial Chamber must be commended for treating sexual violence as among the ranks 
of other violent crimes in terms of the framing of the common purpose. However, the 
Trial Chamber judgment is illustrative of a limited and inconsistent approach to the 
interpretation and the engendering of legal concepts within joint criminal enterprise as 
a mode of liability, in this case the element of foreseeability. The Trial Chamber 
decision is demonstrative of the limited ability of the court to interpret and consider 
individual criminal responsibility for sexual violence crimes through a gender lens.244 
However, as the trial judgment was overruled upon appeal, a critique of this judgment 
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will only briefly touched upon and the focus of this part will be upon the commendable 
approach of the Appeals Chamber.  
 
The Trial Chamber treated sexual violence as not foreseeable to the accused on the facts 
because specific knowledge of the commission of these crimes was not established.245 
However, the approach of the Appeals Chamber was to consider the foreseeability of 
sexual violence to the wider context of armed conflict. 246  The Appeals Chamber 
explicitly linked the "atmosphere of aggression and violence", environment of "ethnic 
animosity" and knowledge the forcible deportation of Kosovo Albanian civilians, 
particularly women, to the foreseeability of such crimes.247  
 
Moreover, the Appeals Chamber did not compare the facts of the present case with the 
finding of foreseeability in Krstic or Kvocka.248 The Trial Chamber's analogy with 
Krstic was concerning as, in that case, the foreseeability of murders and rapes were 
both found on the same facts: the lack of shelter, density of the crowds, vulnerable 
conditions of the refugees, the presence of many regular and irregular military and 
paramilitary units, and lack of sufficient numbers of UN soldiers.249 Moreover, the 
Kvocka case comments as to the foreseeability of sexual violence were obiter given the 
case was decided under systemic joint criminal enterprise, and therefore were coloured 
by the factual context of a camp of systemic ill treatment.250  
 
However, at no point did the Trial or Appeals Chamber consider the question of 
expansion of the common purpose to include these crimes, such that both Chambers 
appeared content to consider murder, property damage and sexual violence as falling 
outside the common purpose.251 Given jurisprudence of the ICTY, these convictions 
may still be lodged for these crimes under the extended form of joint criminal 
enterprise. 252 However, reluctance to consider these crimes as within the common 
purpose poses the question: to what extent is the framing of the common purpose at the 
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ICTY shaped, or limited, by its ability to render convictions for those crimes that fall 
outside of the common purpose but remain natural and foreseeable consequences of 
that common purpose? 
 
For example, the ICTR in Rwamakuba held that liability under joint criminal enterprise 
"may be as narrow or as broad as the plan in which [the accused] willingly participated 
. . . even if the plan amounts to a ‘nation wide government-organized system of cruelty 
and injustice.'" 253  However, the burden of identifying, with specificity, the 
characteristics of the joint criminal enterprise, identification of its members and the 
crimes that constitute that joint criminal enterprise, combined with the requirement for 
significant contribution make it advantageous to frame the joint criminal enterprise 
narrowly.254 Given the lower standard of evidence required to charge crimes outside 
the common criminal combined with the ability to convict for those crimes, the ICTY 
may more readily frame the common purpose and its encompassing crimes narrowly.255 
Such an approach may be contrasted with the jurisprudence of the ICC, as a judicial 
entity that may only convict an accused for crimes that fall within the common purpose, 
therefore is incentivised to frame that purpose widely in order to convict an 
individual.256  
 
Another concern with the manner in which this case was brought includes the limited 
charges of sexual assault. The prosecution charged all rapes as a crime against humanity 
through the crime of persecutions.257 As the Statute of the ICTY requires the additional 
elements of discriminatory intent to grounds of ethnicity, some rapes were considered 
to fall outside the common purpose because witnesses did not explicitly refer to any 
verbal insult concerning their ethnicity.258 Due to the failure of the prosecutor to bring 
sexual violence as a charge independently, the accused were not held responsible for 
them.259 Both this concern, and the aforementioned, play out more poignantly in the 
next case to be addressed, Đorđević.                                                          
253 Prosectuor v Rwamakuba (Judgment) ICTR Trial Chamber III ICTR-98-44C-T, 20 September 2006 
at [368]. 
254  Jared L Watkins and Randle C DeFalco "Joint Criminal Enterprise and the Jurisdiction of the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia"  (2010) Rutgers L Rev 63(1) 183 at 247.  
255 Ciorciari, above n 191, at 1113.  
256 Rome Statute, art 25(3)(d).  
257 Prosecutor v Miluntinovic (Trial Judgment) at Vol 1 [6]. 
258 At Vol 1I [1245]. 
259 Mischkowski and Mlinarevic, above n 244, at 37. 
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B Đorđević  
 
The case of Đorđević concerned the Assistant Minister of the Serbian Ministry of 
Interior responsible for all units and personnel in Serbia, including Kosovo, between 1 
January and 20 June 1999. He was charged for his participation in the deportation and 
forcible transfer of approximately 800,000 Kosovo Albanian civilians, and persecutions 
directed at the Kosovo Albanian population.260  
1 Actus reus 
 
The Trial Chamber found that a common plan existed among the senior political, 
military and police leadership to modify the ethnic balance of Kosovo by waging a 
"campaign of terror" against the Kosovo Albanian civilian population.261 The common 
plan included murder, deportation, forcible transfer and the destruction of religious and 
culturally significant property.262  The crimes were committed in the course of pre-
planned and coordinated actions by Serbian forces who were given deliberately vague 
instructions such that they could implement them as they saw fit.263 The practice of 
Serbian forces expelling Kosovo Albanian villagers, accompanied by executions of the 
male villagers of fighting age, became "typical".264  
 
The Trial Chamber found that the accused contributed significantly and voluntarily to 
the campaign of terror and extreme violence given his role as a senior MUP official, 
contribution to the deployment of paramilitary units, the concealment of the crime of 
murder of civilians and failure to take any measures to ensure the investigation of 
punishment of those involved in their commission.265 
 
The Chamber accepted that two instances of sexual assault had occurred.266 However, 
the Trial Chamber elected not to consider whether sexual assault was part of the                                                         
260 Prosecutor v Ðordević (Trial Judgment) ICTY Trial Chamber II IT-05-87/1-T, 23 February 2011 at 
[2]. 
261 Prosecutor v Ðordević (Trial Judgment) at [2126]. 
262 At [2126], [2149].  
263 At [2132], [2135], [2151].  
264 At [2136].  
265 At [2154-2157].  
266 At [1796].  
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criminal purpose as it was not satisfied in the first instance that such assaults had been 
committed with the discriminatory intent required for the crime of persecution.267 The 
Appeals Chamber reversed acquittals on charges of rape and sexualised violence, 
finding that the crime of persecution as a crime against humanity had been established 
with the requisite discriminatory intent.268 The Appeals Chamber considered specific 
circumstances of sexual assaults, as well as the broader context of sexual assault that 
took place in the context of the systematic campaign of terror and violence involving 
the commission of numerous persecutory acts against Kosovo Albanians. 269  The 
evidence suggested that the sexual assaults arose out of a will to discriminate against 
women on ethnic grounds.270 It concluded that the crime of persecution as a crime 
against humanity was established through sexual assault.271 
2 Mens rea 
 
The Trial Chamber considered Đorđević acted with the requisite intent for basic joint 
criminal enterprise liability as regards deportation, forcible transfer and the destruction 
of religious and culturally significant property given his knowledge of the crimes 
committed, attempts to obstruct justice, and failure to ensure investigation and 
sanction.272  
 
On appeal, sexual violence through persecution was charged and assessed under 
extended joint criminal enterprise.273 The Appeals Chamber noted the Trial Chamber's 
findings that "[a] core element of the common plan was the creation of an atmosphere 
of violence and fear or terror among the Kosovo Albanian population" through the 
commission of violent crimes. Women, as well as men and boys, were targeted and 
killed with the intent to instil fear.274 Massive columns of displaced Kosovo Albanians 
left their towns and villages, escorted by Serbian forces who continued to intimidate 
and abuse them. In these circumstances, the Appeals Chamber considered the civilians 
were "left highly vulnerable, lacking protection, and exposed to abuse and mistreatment                                                         
267 At [2150], [1796].  
268 Prosecutor v Ðordević (Appeal Judgement), above n 5, [901].  
269 At [891].  
270 Prosecutor v Ðordević (Appeal Judgement) at [892], [893], [895], [897]. 
271 At [901].  
272 At [2158].  
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274 At [921]. 
 45 
by members of the Serbian forces."275 Moreover, the Appeals Chamber noted that men 
and women were frequently separated by Serbian forces acting with near impunity, 
rendering women especially vulnerable to being subjected to violence, "including 
violence of a sexual nature as one of the most degrading and humiliating forms".  The 
Appeals Chamber therefore had "no doubt" that sexual assaults were a natural and 
foreseeable consequence of the common purpose.276  
 
Given Đorđević's knowledge of the conduct of operations, overall security situation on 
the ground in Kosovo and specific commission of serious crimes, the possibility that 
sexual assaults might be committed was sufficiently substantial as to be foreseeable for 
him and he willingly took that risk when he participated in the joint criminal 
enterprise.277  
 
Judge Tuzmukhamedov in the Appeals Chamber issued a partially dissenting opinion 
on the foreseeability of sexual violence crimes to Đorđević. He found that the Majority 
"loosely" connected  the general context of the conflict in Kosovo with the accused's 
position within the MUP to conclude that it was foreseeable to him that these crimes 
must be committed.278  The Judge was doubtful whether the Majority's inferring of the 
foreseeability of sexual assaults from other distinct types of crimes were appropriate 
and noted that the Majority did not point to evidence that Đorđević knew of the factors 
that were placing women in a vulnerable position at the relevant time.279 
3 Analysis 
 
At the trial stage, the relationship between sexual violence and the common purpose 
was not analysed because it was not established at first instance that sexual violence 
through persecution had been committed.280 Again, we see a failure of the Prosecutor 
to allege sexual violence crimes as a charge independent of persecution, therefore 
risking the acquittal of the accused for these crimes because of the failure of the 
Prosecution case to make out elements of the crime of prosecution unrelated to                                                         
275 At [921].  
276 At [922].  
277 Prosecutor v Ðordević (Appeal Judgement) ar [924]-[926].  
278 Prosecutor v Ðordević (Dissenting Opinion of Just Tuzmukhamedov) at [64].  
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280 Prosecutor v Ðorñević (Trial Judgment) at [2150], [1796].  
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established elements of sexual violence. 281  Fortunately, the Appeals Chamber 
concluded that the crime of persecution as a crime against humanity was established 
through relevant sexual assaults, and that their commission, while outside the common 
purpose, amounted to a natural and foreseeable consequence of the common purpose.282 
This conviction is the first step to equal acknowledgement of sexual violence as a crime 
worthy of interest at international criminal law.283  
 
However, the judgment is illustrative of a limited application of gender principles to 
the trial of sexual violence. Principally, the election to bring charges for sexual violence 
under extended joint criminal enterprise severely restricted the ability of the Court to 
advance jurisprudence in this area: there was no analysis of whether sexual violence 
may have, or may not have, fallen within the common purpose. While it is appreciated 
that prosecutors must need to be selective, since international criminal tribunals may 
not have the resources to extend difficult legal arguments, such discretion must be 
exercised in a transparent and principled manner.284 Moreover, Prosecutors cannot fall 
into a trap of trying challenging crimes, such as sexual violence, under extended joint 
criminal enterprise because this mode of liability is easier to prove and still results in a 
conviction.285 
 
However, a conviction based on systemic mischaracterisation of sexual violence as 
outside the common purpose erroneously cements the secondary status of these crimes 
at international law.286 The functions of international criminal law in post-conflict 
reconstruction requires that the application of law in judicial proceedings is not limited 
in its articulation of the nature of the crimes that were committed.287 This part will argue 
that there were grounds to consider sexual violence as a constituent crime of the 
common purpose of "creation of an atmosphere of violence and fear or terror among 
the Kosovo Albanian population".288 There are four grounds upon which this argument 
will be made: sexual violence was necessary to achieve the common purpose, along                                                         
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with the other violent crimes charged; dolus directus in the second degree suggests that 
these crimes could fall within the common purpose as occurring in the ordinary course 
of events; the scale of sexual violence lends itself to a finding that these crimes were 
part of the common purpose; and the sexual violence crimes must be seen in light of 
the wider context of ethnic conflict.  
 
First, women, as well as men and boys, were targeted and killed with the intent to instil 
fear.289 The Appeals Chamber noted that men and women were frequently separated by 
Serbian forces acting with near impunity, rendering women especially vulnerable to 
being targeted and subjected to violence on the basis of their ethnicity, "including 
violence of a sexual nature as one of the most degrading and humiliating forms".290 In 
these circumstances, the Appeals Chamber considered the civilians were "left highly 
vulnerable, lacking protection, and exposed to abuse and mistreatment by members of 
the Serbian forces."291 Moreover, the Trial Chamber explicitly linked murders to the 
common purpose by finding that these crimes were used to force the civilian population 
to leave by illustrating to those civilians what they would be subjected to if they refused 
to leave and creating an atmosphere of terror.292 The same reasoning can be applied to 
the use of sexual violence: widespread rape and sexual abuse may contribute to the 
atmosphere of terror and violence and induce civilians to leave their homes, given rape 
is an established weapon of ethnic conflict and a tool of terror.293  
 
Second, while sexual violence crimes may not have been explicitly pre-planned, there 
is room to consider whether sexual violence fell within the common purpose following 
dolus directus in the second degree, as whether the criminal enterprise participants 
knew that such crimes would occur in the ordinary course of events.294 A finding of 
knowledge in the ordinary course of events is challenged by lack of evidence as to the 
accused's specific knowledge of the commission of these crimes during the execution 
of the common purpose.295 However, given Đorđević's knowledge of the conduct of 
operations, overall security situation on the ground in Kosovo including vulnerability                                                         
289 Prosecutor v Ðordević (Appeal Judgment) at [921]. 
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of civilians, the specific commission of serious crimes, and the irrefutable link between 
sexual violence both violent crime and armed conflict, there is room to argue that sexual 
violence was an ordinary consequence of the common purpose.296 
 
Third, as regards to the scale of the sexual assault, the Appeals Chamber was convinced 
of four instances of sexual assault beyond reasonable doubt. Three young women held 
in detention in Beleg were sexually assaulted or raped multiple times by Serbian forces, 
and the Appeals Chamber further found established the multiple rape of a Kosovo 
Albanian girl in a convoy in Pristina.297 Moreover, according to one witness testimony, 
20 further women were removed from detention in Beleg by Serbian forces, in 
circumstances that suggested their sexual assault or rape.298 This evidence suggests that 
not only were specific instances of sexual assaults and rape established, but there was 
circumstantial evidence to suggest such crimes were widespread. Moreover, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber has stated that there is no legal requirement that a minimum number 
of crimes are committed before a finding that that crime is part of a joint criminal 
enterprise. 299 To argue numbers meant that a crime did not amount to part of the 
common purpose is to conflate the objective of the joint criminal enterprise with the 
means through which it was to be achieved.300 Moreover, to find that the number of 
sexual assaults confine these crimes to fall outwith the common purpose fails to 
comprehensively recognise the wider range of harms elicited by these crimes.301 
 
Finally, and as repeated multiple times throughout this thesis, there is a well-established 
link between sexual violence and ethnic conflict. To consider sexual assault as not part 
of a common criminal plan to create an atmosphere of violence in order to modify the 
ethnic balance of Kosovo to ensure Serbian control over the province refutes an 
abundance of jurisprudence and empirical evidence that suggests sexual violence is a 
commonly used tactic to undertake ethnically motivated attacks.302 
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The long-term success of post-conflict societal reconstruction and deterrence of future 
repetitions rests upon understanding and legally articulating crimes. Where the law only 
shallowly addresses sexual violence and fails to engender equality and nullify 
discrimination, the practical and symbolic importance of criminal accountability is 
undermined. 303 The following section will provide some comments that intend to give 
meaningful guidance to the bringing of charges, interpretation of the law and 
engendering of legal concepts at international criminal law in order to advance the 
prospects of justice for the victims of sexual violence and post-conflict reconstruction.  
VI Where to from here?  
 
Despite the positive steps toward justice for sexual violence crimes at international 
criminal law, challenges lie ahead as to be best possible interpretation and application 
of the law.304 These cases illustrate the manner in which the ongoing practice of gender 
inequality distorts and impedes the possibility of gender justice.305 This part will seek 
to provide prosecution and judges with meaningful guidance for the interpretation and 
application of modes of individual criminal responsibility.  
 
First, the prosecution of sexual violence still requires significant external lobbying and 
advocacy.306 It is vital that charges for sexual and gender-based crimes are brought 
wherever there is sufficient evidence to support such charges, both directly and 
indirectly, and as different categories of crimes.307 As one of the principal functions of 
international courts are to deter the commission of crimes, failure to bring charges may 
send the signal that such crimes may be committed with impunity.308  
 
Moreover, if prosecutions are to be fair and just from the perspective of the accused, 
victims and local and international communities, it is necessary that charges for sexual 
violence must be framed to allow legal argument to fully canvas the true relationship 
between sexual violence crimes and the common purpose. This may be achieved at the                                                         
303 Ni Aolain et al, above n 11, at 425.  
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ICTY through bringing charges dually under the heads of basic, and extended joint 
criminal enterprise in the alternative. Convictions based on the systemic 
mischaracterisation of sexual violence crimes as outside the common purpose do not 
result in meaningful progress towards the equal integration of sexual violence crimes 
into international criminal law. While conviction is the first step to achieving proper 
recognition of sexual violence at international criminal law, as Judge Hunt of the ICTY 
recently opined in dissent from a procedural ruling on the admissibility of written 
witness statements, "[t]his Tribunal will not be judged by the number of convictions 
which it enters... but by the fairness of its trials."309  
 
Further, while the ICC Trial Chamber in Katanga stated that the similarity of the 
common purpose doctrine between joint criminal enterprise and art 25(3)(d) 
jurisprudence meant that rulings of the ad hoc tribunals were of the "utmost pertinence" 
to the art 25(3)(d) analysis, it is important to distinguish the jurisprudence of the two 
different institutions.310 The ICC Chambers must take a cautious approach to adopting 
the jurisprudence of ad hoc tribunals that employ extended joint criminal enterprise as 
a mode of liability, as there is some ground to believe that the ability to convict without 
crimes falling within the common purpose will result in a more narrowly framed joint 
criminal enterprise.  
 
Finally, charges for sexual violence must be brought independently of other crimes such 
as persecution in order to reduce the risk that an accused may be acquitted of sexual 
violence charges due to failure to achieve a legal standard that is in addition to the actus 
reus and mens rea of sexual violence.311 
 
Second, both art 25(3)(d) and joint criminal enterprise are premised on the articulation 
of a common purpose. At the ICTY, a secondary consideration is the foreseeability of 
the crime. However, jurisprudence from both the ICC and ICTY are suggestive of a 
higher evidentiary standard applied to sexual violence in order to establish the same 
relationship with the common purpose or foreseeability as other violent crimes. The                                                         
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Courts must place an emphasis on applying consistent reasoning to both sexual violence 
and other violent crimes. For example, where murder and property damage are linked 
to the forcible deportation of civilians, sexual violence should also be considered as a 
tool of terror to force civilians out of their homes.312  
 
Third, the ICC and ICTY must move beyond the distinctly gendered approach towards 
sexual violence that assesses these crimes in terms of numbers and a masculine 
conception of harm.313 There is no legal requirement for a minimum number of crimes 
to be committed before that crime may fall within the common purpose, as to consider 
these crimes by numbers is to confuse the common purpose with the means by which 
it is to be achieved.314 This lends support to an emphasis on sexual violence crimes 
where evidence of specific instances is low due to structural barriers to investigating 
sexual violence crimes and the social ostracism faced by victims and witnesses that 
restrict willingness to participate in criminal law proceedings.315 Moreover, sexual 
violence cannot continue to be considered a secondary crime due to a masculine 
conception of harm that does not encapsulate the full range of harms caused by these 
crimes. Rape and sexual violence can include considerable physical violence, but also 
elicit a wider range of harms, including emotional and psychological to the woman and 
the body politic she represents that is not comprehensively recognised in legal 
systems.316 "Massacres kill the body. Rape kills the soul".317  
 
Fourth, particular importance must be placed on sexual violence because it is easy for 
judges to see such crimes as an unfortunate by-product of conflict, rather than 
something directly linked with the armed conflict, orchestrated and foreseeable.318 
When applying the common purpose modes of individual criminal liability to sexual 
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violence crimes, it is vital to place the crimes within the wider context of armed, and 
especially ethnic, conflict. 319  
 
Lastly, criminal tribunals must explore the full potential of the evidence and different 
modes of liability to ensure high-level political and military leaders can be linked to 
crimes that are not necessarily directly sanctioned.320 For example, dolus directus in 
the second degree, or knowledge that the crime with happen in the ordinary course of 
events, in order to prove that crimes fall within the common purpose and are within the 
accused's awareness may be an avenue through which sexual violence may be 
established as part of the common purpose.321   
VII Conclusion  
 
Criminal accountability is a central component of the rebuilding process that 
accompanies the end of entrenched violence between and within states. The United 
Nations Security Council has recently emphasised the obligation on all states to ensure 
that all victims of sexual violence, particularly women and girls, have equal protection 
under the law and equal access to justice, recognising that "[w]omen and girls are 
particularly targeted by the use of sexual violence, including as a tactic of war to 
humiliate, dominate, instil fear in, disperse, and/or forcibly relocate civilian members 
of a community or ethnic group."322 Crime and mode of liability selection are two of 
the most important decisions at international criminal courts because it helps to 
determine the role such courts play in the global legal order.323 Throughout history, 
there has been resistance to investigating and prosecuting sexual violence crimes, due 
to the belief that these crimes were less serious than other violent crimes or unconnected 
to the armed conflict and outside the realm of international humanitarian law. 324 
However, since post-World War II trials, advocates have sought increased attention to 
sex crimes. International courts have, to some extent, heeded their call.325    
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Prosecution of sexual violence crimes is a key component to ending global violence 
against women: forms of sexual violence must be punished and seen to be punished, if 
the cycle of sexual violence is to be prevented.326 Undeniably, conviction for sexual 
violence crimes is a positive step towards justice for victims of sexual violence and the 
reconstruction of post-conflict societies. However, there remains a need for better 
implementation and prosecution of sexual violence at the international criminal 
level.327  This paper looks past the binary of conviction versus acquittal to draw out the 
limited and inconsistent interpretation of the law and engendering of legal concepts of 
sexual violence crimes, which is prevalent in all three judgments. In particular, the 
paper will analyse the three judgments for indicia of an inconsistent factual treatment 
of sexual violence as compared to other violent crimes; failure to utilise legal concepts 
to reflect the nature of sexual violence crimes; incomplete assessment of the scale and 
harm of sexual violence crimes; and failure to place sexual violence crimes within the 
wide context of armed conflict.   
 
This paper has sought to illustrate that steps must still be taken to ensure equal 
recognition for sexual violence crimes at international criminal law. Where sexual 
violence becomes a predictable pattern in an armed conflict, the lack of convictions that 
reflect genuinely the place of sexual violence within the conflict's structure is another 
obstacle in sexual violence crimes slow road to equal recognition at international 
criminal law: "How is it that survivors of rape can have their attack acknowledged by 
the international community while at the same time justice does not apply?"328 
The final section of this paper has sought to provide some meaningful guidance for the 
interpretation of the law of individual criminal responsibility law in sexual violence 
cases through a gendered lens. The first is a plea to prosecutors and judges at the 
international courts and ad hoc tribunals alike to ensure a legal articulation of sexual 
violence crimes that accurately reflects the role that sexual violence plays within 
common criminal purposes and the greater armed conflict.  The second is to approach 
the relationship of sexual violence with the common purpose and foreseeability with                                                         
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the same logic that is applied in other instances of violent crimes. The third is to take a 
gendered approach to the assessment of the harm and scale of sexual violence, such that 
these crimes may be appreciated on an equal level with other violent crimes. The fourth 
is to place particular importance on the relationship between sexual violence and wider 
armed conflicts. Finally, a wider range of legal concepts, such as dolus directus in the 
second degree must be utilised to link sexual violence to the common purpose.  
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